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The Contingency of NecessityReason and God as Matters of Fact$
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Tyler Tritten

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9781474428194

Published to Edinburgh Scholarship Online: May 2018

DOI: 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428194.001.0001

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Decision and Withdrawal: On the Facticity and Posteriority of God

Decision and Withdrawal: On the Facticity and Posteriority of God

(p.136) Chapter 5 Decision and Withdrawal: On the Facticity and Posteriority of God
The Contingency of Necessity

Tyler Tritten

Edinburgh University Press

This chapter argues that God is an eternal fact, thus an eternally contingent consequence, the factum brutum. Employing Schelling’s later notion of “unprethinkability” it is argued that as unprethinkable primal being is not unthinkable but only post-thinkable. Being, including the being of God, can only be thought in its consequence. If being exists in a cold, mute, neutral and mechanistic way, then being, post factum, proves ungodly. But, if being exists graciously, personally and as the result of freedom, then being exists in a godly way. Whether or not unprethinkable being is then consequently to be identified as Godly or ungodly is something only constituted retroactively, that is, neither a priori nor even a posteriori, but per posterius.

Keywords:   God, Facticity, Per posterius, Decision, Freedom

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