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The Contingency of NecessityReason and God as Matters of Fact$
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Tyler Tritten

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9781474428194

Published to Edinburgh Scholarship Online: May 2018

DOI: 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428194.001.0001

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Reason as Consequent Universal: On Thinking and Being

Reason as Consequent Universal: On Thinking and Being

Chapter:
(p.103) Chapter 4 Reason as Consequent Universal: On Thinking and Being
Source:
The Contingency of Necessity
Author(s):

Tyler Tritten

Publisher:
Edinburgh University Press
DOI:10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428194.003.0005

Turning to the later Schelling, this chapter shows how Schelling regards reason itself as a matter of fact rather than as a self-founding truth of reason. There is not being because there is reason or thinking, but there is reason because there is being. Reason is thus only explicable through a historical, rather than rational, account of its emergence from non-reason. Reason is thus a contingently eternal matter of fact, something which eternally is but could have never been, consequent upon pre-rational being. Schelling does not fall prey to irrationalism, but he does ask why there is reason rather than unreason. Reason too is something for which an account must be given.

Keywords:   Reason, Schelling, Logic, Thinking

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