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The Contingency of NecessityReason and God as Matters of Fact$
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Tyler Tritten

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9781474428194

Published to Edinburgh Scholarship Online: May 2018

DOI: 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428194.001.0001

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Boutroux’s Alternative: An Ontology of the Fact

Boutroux’s Alternative: An Ontology of the Fact

Chapter:
(p.44) Chapter 2 Boutroux’s Alternative: An Ontology of the Fact
Source:
The Contingency of Necessity
Author(s):

Tyler Tritten

Publisher:
Edinburgh University Press
DOI:10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428194.003.0003

Boutroux, approximately 150 years prior to Meillassoux, already argued for the contingency of laws of nature, as well as truths of logic and mathematics. Boutroux, however, does not espouse factiality, namely, the necessity of contingent beings, but he rather offers a veritable ontology of the fact. Boutroux does not abandon necessity, but he does show how all necessity is itself consequent, that is, a matter of fact. He does this by arguing for the laws of nature as nothing but the habit of nature, which springs not from chance but from spontaneity. Being bottoms out in pontaneity rather than in simple randomness.

Keywords:   Natural Law, Contingency, Boutroux, Empiricism

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