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The Contingency of NecessityReason and God as Matters of Fact$
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Tyler Tritten

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9781474428194

Published to Edinburgh Scholarship Online: May 2018

DOI: 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428194.001.0001

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Meillassoux against the Principle of Reason: An Ontology of Factiality

Meillassoux against the Principle of Reason: An Ontology of Factiality

Chapter:
(p.17) Chapter 1 Meillassoux against the Principle of Reason: An Ontology of Factiality
Source:
The Contingency of Necessity
Author(s):

Tyler Tritten

Publisher:
Edinburgh University Press
DOI:10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428194.003.0002

While Meillassoux has famously argued for the necessity of contingency, this chapter offers a critique of Meillassoux in order to pose the possibility of the contingency of necessity. An alternative conception of chaos, in opposition to Meillassoux’s Hyper-Chaos, is offered that is not amenable to an empirical rather than rationalist approach, even if Meillassoux does reject the principle of sufficient reason. In addition, Meillassoux’s argument for factiality and his argument that only contradictory beings are necessary beings, and therefore cannot exist, are exposed as sophistical.

Keywords:   Factiality, Metaphysics, Principle of Sufficient Reason, Meillassoux

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