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Garcian MeditationsThe Dialectics of Persistence in Form and Object$
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Jon Cogburn

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9781474415910

Published to Edinburgh Scholarship Online: January 2018

DOI: 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474415910.001.0001

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Neither Substance Nor Process II: Two Modes

Neither Substance Nor Process II: Two Modes

Chapter:
(p.105) 5 Neither Substance Nor Process II: Two Modes
Source:
Garcian Meditations
Author(s):

Jon Cogburn

Publisher:
Edinburgh University Press
DOI:10.3366/edinburgh/9781474415910.003.0005

Chapter V begins by rehearsing the distinction between substance and process philosophies and how Garcia attempts to avoid problems with both. Of particular relevance is Graham Harman’s claim that Garcia’s characterization of an object in terms of its difference from that which it comprehends and from what comprehends it ends up, actually in the characteristic manner of process philosophies, having the object depend on these very things. Changing any of the comprehended or comprehending things would change the precise difference in question, resulting in a different object. Worse, since the object is comprehended by all of the relations that it has to every other object, Garcia seems to be committed to the view that the object’s identity is a function of everything in the universe, a position which easily veers into the (British) Hegelian affirmation that there is only one thing. Discussing Garcia allows me to pose this problem in a novel way, via what I call the Putnam/Parmenides argument.

Keywords:   Tristan Garcia, Graham Harman, Hegel, metaphysical holism, Parmenides, process philosophy, Hilary Putnam, Putnam/Parmenides argument, substance metaphysics

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