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The Problem of Secret Intelligence$

Kjetil Anders Hatlebrekke

Print publication date: 2019

Print ISBN-13: 9780748691838

Published to Edinburgh Scholarship Online: January 2020

DOI: 10.3366/edinburgh/9780748691838.001.0001

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(p.266) Notes

(p.266) Notes

Source:
The Problem of Secret Intelligence
Author(s):

Kjetil Anders Hatlebrekke

Publisher:
Edinburgh University Press

Introduction

(1.) The term should be understood as the misconceptions caused by an opponents’ targeted use of digital platforms for the sake of deception. Digideceptionalisation increases when misunderstood secrecy, intelligence tribal language and the conventional belief in historical reproduction mutate and interact with the opponent’s digital deception. The term will not be analysed further, other than to be used as an introductory explanation of why the plethora of misleading and confusing data is a bigger challenge now than ever before.

(5.) This definition was first presented to the Research Advisory Board at the Norwegian Defence Intelligence School, 1 April 2012.

(6.) Ibid.

(11.) Ibid. p. 142.

(16.) Omand, lecture to the Professional Advanced Intelligence course, The Norwegian Defence University College, Oslo (7 October 2008). Omand presented elucidation as a way of looking afresh at the classical processes of analysis and assessment that seek to shed light on the real world seen through the prism of intelligence.

(20.) Ibid.

(35.) Smith, lecture to the Professional Advanced Intelligence course, The Norwegian Defence University College, Oslo (26 September 2008).

(37.) Ibid. p. 96.

(p.268) (43.) Ibid. See also Popper, Unended Quest, p. 171.

(48.) Blackburn, Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, p. 14, see analysis. See also holism, p. 177.

(72.) Ibid. p. 4.

(74.) Ibid. p. 7.

(75.) Ibid. p. 14.

(80.) Ibid. p. 16.

(81.) Ibid. p. 18.

(82.) Ibid. p. 20.

(89.) Ibid. p. 57.

(103.) Coker, lecture to the Norwegian Naval Special Operations Conference, Bergen (27–8 August 2007). Coker lends support to the presented argument when he emphasises that threats are in constant change, and that this in itself creates a challenge for cognition and thus poses a threat to perception.

Chapter 1

(12.) Ibid. p. 320.

(13.) Ibid. p. 142.

(14.) Ibid. p. 67.

(15.) Ibid. p. 320.

(16.) Ibid. p. 192.

(24.) Ibid. p. 50.

(25.) Ibid. p. 5.

(28.) Ibid. p. 4.

(30.) Ibid. p. 306.

(36.) Ibid. p. 377.

(40.) Ibid. p. 130.

(42.) Ibid. p. 131.

(p.272) (47.) Ibid. p. 187.

(49.) Ibid. p. 401.

(62.) Ibid. p. 179.

(70.) Ibid. p. 21.

(71.) Ibid. p. 23.

(74.) Knut Aasberg, former Director of Division in the Norwegian Intelligence Service, argued in a discussion at the Norwegian Defence University College (28 April 2010) that intelligence services can only hope to reduce the danger of intelligence failure if they search for the swans that are not white.

Chapter 2

(6.) Ibid. p. 9.

(8.) Ibid. p. 12.

(10.) Ibid. p. 11.

(12.) Ibid. p. 266.

(15.) Anjum (2011). The Norwegian philosopher Rani Lill Anjum argues in her work Our Conditional World: A Critique of the Formal Logical Approach that formal logic is illogical since it fails to elucidate logical coherence as well as meaning and context. Available at < https://sites.google.com/site/ranilillanjum/home/research/our-conditional-worldhttps://sites.google.com/site/ranilillanjum/home/research/our-conditional-world > (accessed 7 October 2018).

(25.) Ibid. p. 97.

(26.) Ibid. p. 273.

(28.) Ibid. p. viii.

(30.) Ibid. Herman emphasises the importance of understanding the fundamental difference between the twin skills of intelligence: collection and analysis.

(39.) Aasberg, lecture to the Professional Advanced Intelligence course, Norwegian Defence University College, Oslo (16 September 2008).

(44.) Størmer Thaulow (2008). Størmer Thaulow was a student on the Professional Advanced Intelligence course, Norwegian Defence University College, who argued that the intelligence product is substantially the service intelligence organizations provide to their decision-makers and the society of which they form a part. See also Warner, ‘Intelligence as Risk Shifting’, p. 18.

(48.) Omand, lecture to the Professional Advanced Intelligence course, Norwegian Defense University College, Oslo (7 October 2008). Omand holds that inductive analytic methods are likely to fail to (p.275) comprehend complex future situations, especially low-probability, high-impact events. His use of the term ‘elucidation’ is intended to guide intelligence organisations to rethink how they produce their estimates through a threefold process of establishing situational awareness, arriving at the best explanation of the situation consistent with the available evidence, and then predicting possible outcomes and their relative likelihood. See also Omand, Securing the State, p. 122.

(57.) Ibid. p. 417.

(61.) Ibid.

(64.) Ibid.

(65.) Ibid.

(67.) Ibid. p. 383.

(p.276) (75.) Ibid.

(82.) Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, p. 4. Popper highlights that there is no inference between observed singular premises and universal statements, which means that there is no inference between history and future.

(87.) Ibid. p. 166.

(88.) Ibid. p. 167.

(89.) Branch 3+5+6+Israeli Air Force (IAF) Intelligence Division + Israeli Navy (IN) Intelligence Division, Immediate Military Intelligence Review, ‘Alert Status and Activity in Syria and Egypt as of 051000 Oct. 7’, para. 40 (private collection). Quoted in Bar-Joseph, ‘Intelligence Failure and the Need for Cognitive Closure: The Case of Yom Kippur’, p. 166.

(91.) Ibid. p. 166.

(92.) Ibid. p. 167.

(94.) Plato, Complete Works, p. 27, para. 29 b–c. Socrates contends that he is the wisest man in Athens because he knows that ‘it is the most blameworthy ignorance to believe that one knows what one does not know’.

(96.) Arie Braun, Moshe Dayan and the Yom Kippur War, p. 83. Estimate by Major General (ret.) Avram Adan. Quoted in Bar-Joseph, (p.277) ‘Intelligence Failure and the Need for Cognitive Closure: The Case of Yom Kippur’, p. 170.

(99.) Smith, lecture to the Professional Advanced Intelligence course, Norwegian Defense University College, Oslo (26 September 2008).

(102.) Ibid. pp. 64–7.

(107.) Ibid. p. 426.

(110.) Ibid. p. 105.

(121.) Timeliness, relevance and reliability are the vision and ethos of the Norwegian Intelligence Service.

(126.) Ibid. p. 198.

(127.) Ibid. p. 197.

(136.) Omand, lecture to the Professional Advanced Intelligence course, Norwegian Defense University College, Oslo (7 October 2008). The former UK Intelligence and Security Coordinator suggested elucidation as a way of looking afresh at the classical processes of analysis and assessment that seek to shed light on the real world seen through the prism of intelligence.

(146.) Ibid. p. 136.

(160.) Ibid. p. 427.

(166.) Ibid. pp. 314–15.

(168.) British Joint Operational Intelligence, Annex 1A, p. 1. Quoted in Herman, Intelligence Services in the Information Age, pp. 12 and 13.

(169.) Cradock, Know Your Enemy: How the Joint Intelligence Committee Saw the World, p. 296. Quoted in House of Commons – Foreign Affairs – Ninth Report, article 155, available at < http://www.pub-lications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmfaff/813/81309.htm > (accessed 7 October 2018). See also Omand, Securing the State, p. 180.

(p.280) Chapter 3

(9.) Ibid. p. 87.

(11.) Ibid. p. 4.

(15.) Ibid. p. 7.

(26.) Ibid. p. 416.

(27.) Ibid. p. 417.

(31.) Ibid. p. 417.

(p.281) (32.) Ibid. p. 343.

(33.) Ibid. p. 344.

(34.) Ibid. p. 343.

(39.) Ibid. p. 416.

(45.) Ibid. p. 93.

(46.) Ibid. p. 329.

(52.) Ibid. p. 53.

(60.) Ibid. pp. 416–17.

(61.) Ibid. p. xvi.

Chapter 4

(3.) Ibid. pp. 118–19.

(p.282) (4.) Aasberg, lecture to the Professional Advanced Intelligence course, Norwegian Defence University College, Oslo (16 September 2008). Aasberg is former Director of Division in the Norwegian Intelligence Service and clarified that the intelligence process must be understood as function and not organization.

(39.) Ibid. p. 350.

(57.) Ibid. Finding 1, p. xv.

(60.) Ibid. Finding 5, p. xvi.

(62.) Ibid. p. 330.

(69.) Ibid. p. 347.

(77.) Ibid. p. 87.

(78.) Omand, lecture to the Professional Advanced Intelligence course, Norwegian Defense University College, Oslo (7 October 2008).

(100.) Ibid. p. 4.

(102.) Ibid. p. 5.

(103.) Ibid. p. 4.

(107.) Ibid. pp. 457 and 494.

(109.) Ibid. p. 457.

(114.) Ibid. p. 6.

(116.) Ibid. p. 7.

(121.) Ibid. Related Findings, Finding 17, p. xviii.

(130.) Ibid. p. 185.

(132.) Ibid. p. 4.

(139.) Ibid. pp. 186–87.

(140.) Ibid. p. 187.

Chapter 5

(3.) Ibid. p. 122.

(6.) Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, p. 1.

(11.) Ibid.

(14.) Ibid. p. 169.

(18.) Ibid. p. 170.

(21.) Ibid.

(25.) Ibid. p. 21.

(26.) Ibid. p. 25.

(p.288) (27.) Ibid. p. 20.

(28.) Ibid. p. 23.

(29.) Ibid. p. 19.

(35.) Ibid. p. 18.

(39.) Hatlebrekke. The idea was first presented to the Professional Advanced Intelligence course at the Norwegian Defence University College, Oslo, 21 October 2009.

(43.) Ibid. p. 113.

(47.) The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America, Transformation through Integration and Innovation (October 2005), Strategy Guidance, Mission Objectives, p. 6.

(50.) Ibid. p. 61.

(51.) Ibid. pp. 57–61.

(52.) Ibid. p. 4.

(59.) Omand, lecture to the Professional Advanced Intelligence course, Norwegian Defense University College, Oslo (7 October 2008). Omand holds that most external intelligence agencies now have functions both in actionable intelligence and covert action, as well as in more traditional long-term agent running. Such duality presupposes officers with different personality types: adventurers (camel drivers) and chess masters (playing by ‘Moscow rules’).

(66.) Ibid. p. 209.

(71.) Ibid. p. 345.

(72.) Ibid. p. 341.

(74.) Ibid. p. 152.

(78.) Ibid. p. 4.

(87.) Ibid. p. 259.

(101.) Ibid. p. 204.

(102.) Ibid. p. 255.

(104.) Ibid. p. 256.

(105.) Ibid. p. 257.

(108.) Ibid. p. 212.

(112.) Ibid. p. 153.

(126.) Aasberg, lecture to the Professional Advanced Intelligence course, Norwegian Defence University College, Oslo (16 September 2008). Aasberg is former Director of Division in the Norwegian Intelligence Service and holds that the intelligence cycle must be understood as function and not organisation.

(131.) Ibid. p. 149.

(133.) Ibid. p. 342.

(140.) Ibid. p. 353.

(142.) Ibid. Finding 9, p. xvii.

(150.) Ibid. p. xvi.

Chapter 6

(12.) Ibid. p. 111.

(p.293) (18.) Ibid.

(21.) The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America (October 2005), Transformation through Integration and Innovation, Strategy Guidance, Mission Objectives, p. 6.

(22.) Omand, ‘Reflections on Secret Intelligence’, p. 120. Omand has borrowed the phrase from Senator Pat Roberts, former Chair of the US Senate Intelligence Committee.

(26.) Ibid. p. 364.

(30.) Ibid. p. 362.

(41.) Ibid. p. 75.

(p.294) (49.) Ibid.

(51.) Ibid. p. 474.

(55.) Ibid. pp. 163–64.

(56.) Ibid. p. 153.

(57.) Ibid. p. 154.

(64.) Ibid. p. 126.

(65.) The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America (October 2005), Transformation through Integration and Innovation, p. 3.

Chapter 7

(2.) Ibid. p. 129.

(4.) Ibid. p. 14.

(9.) Ibid. p. 127.

(p.295) (10.) Ibid. p. 125.

(11.) Ibid. p. 124.

(15.) Ibid. p. 17.

(31.) Borchgrevink, ‘What kind of ideas kill?’. Aage Borchrevink, a Norwegian author and columnist argued in the Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten on 4 August 2011 that Occidentalism may explain the real danger from terrorism today, since Occidentalism highlights that it is the hatred against Western values such as liberalism, individualism, capitalism and secularism that is al Qaeda’s and the Oslo bomber’s real motivation. The term Occidentalism used by Borchrevink originates from Ian Buruma’s and Avishai Margalit’s book: Occidentalism: The West in the Eyes of its Enemies (2004).

(37.) Ibid. p. 75.

(44.) Ibid. p. 234.

(45.) Ibid. p. 235.

(58.) Ibid. p. 10.

(62.) Ibid. p. 11.

(66.) Ibid. p. 9.

(p.297) (67.) Ibid. p. 10.

(68.) Ibid. p. 12.

(71.) Ibid. p. 11.

(73.) The Joint Inquiry, p. 298. See also p. 231.

(85.) Ibid. p. 402.