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Immanence - Deleuze and Philosophy$
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Miguel de Beistegui

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780748638307

Published to Edinburgh Scholarship Online: September 2012

DOI: 10.3366/edinburgh/9780748638307.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM EDINBURGH SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.edinburgh.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Edinburgh University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in ESO for personal use.date: 17 September 2021

Noology

Noology

Chapter:
(p.5) 1 Noology
Source:
Immanence - Deleuze and Philosophy
Author(s):

Miguel de Beistegui

Publisher:
Edinburgh University Press
DOI:10.3366/edinburgh/9780748638307.003.0002

This chapter asks whether immanence can itself become an object of thought, can be turned into something which thought could hold up before itself, and clarify completely. Philosophical concepts are neither objects of contemplation, nor acts of reflection, nor innate or a priori structures, nor even protocols of communication. Rather, they are processes of creation. The creation of concepts always presupposes a proper name, or a signature. It then explores the second major thesis of What is Philosophy? introduced immediately after that concerning the creation of concepts. Philosophy begins with concepts, but finds itself instituted or established through a plane, which it draws and which is itself pre- conceptual. The singularity and difficulty of Deleuzian thought lies in the double axiom constitutive of its image. Immanence turns out to be the ‘cornerstone’ of philosophy.

Keywords:   immanence, creation, concepts, What is Philosophy, Deleuzian thought, philosophy, object of thought

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