Critique and the Ends of Reason
Critique and the Ends of Reason
This chapter explores Immanuel Kant's own systematic account of the critical project. It also demonstrates how Kant locates the implicit metacritical dimension of the critical project within a transcendental account of human culture. Kant understands that the deduction of freedom in the Groundwork is inadequate, thus precipitating the revision of the Critique of Pure Reason and the writing of the Critique of Practical Reason. There is one fundamental distinction in the Critique of Pure Reason, concerning thought and intuition. In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant describes the ends of reason as interests of reason. The problems that have been determined in the account of the self-critique of reason can be decreased to equivocity of reason and unity of reason. Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling's ‘metaphysical empiricism’ involves acts of ‘psychic repetition’. It is noted that human history is to be examined from the perspective of the concept of ‘repetition’.
Keywords: Immanuel Kant, human culture, critical project, Critique of Practical Reason, reason, metaphysical empiricism, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, psychic repetition, repetition, human history
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