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The Idea of Continental Philosophy$
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Simon Glendinning

Print publication date: 2006

Print ISBN-13: 9780748624706

Published to Edinburgh Scholarship Online: September 2012

DOI: 10.3366/edinburgh/9780748624706.001.0001

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The (B)end of the Idea

The (B)end of the Idea

(p.115) 6 The (B)end of the Idea
The Idea of Continental Philosophy

Simon Glendinning

Edinburgh University Press

This chapter compares and contrasts two responses that anyone who spends significant time with texts identified as Continental philosophy is likely to experience: that of the “ender” and that of the “bender”. The ender is the one who knows that the very idea of a Continental tradition is contentious or even perverse and so will be inclined to work with a certain lack of interest in securing or maintaining the idea of the analytic/Continental division. The bender response demands that we acknowledge the de facto distinction, and its real world gulf-effects, and is willing to appropriate the title “Continental philosophy” for their own work in order to do so. The argument of the book concludes that whether one might want to take on the responsibility of using this title oneself will remain the singular existential-institutional question for every reader of “Continental philosophy” for some time to come.

Keywords:   “enders”, “benders”, “de facto distinction”, “existential-institutional question”

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