Knowledge is a state of mind; it is a disposition to behave distinct from the disposition that is the corresponding belief, but at the same time necessitating the existence of such a belief. This chapter defends the following principle concerning knowledge: A subject knows whether p if and only if the subject is disposed to behave in a way that is governed by a version of practical rationality that is sensitive to whether or not p. This approach can be generalised to knowledge of who, why, what, how, etc. It can also be extended to knowledge of things, as follows: A subject knows a thing if and only if the subject is disposed to behave in a way that is governed by a version of practical rationality that is sensitive to answers to questions about that thing. The species of knowledge most often discussed – namely knowledge that – can be understood as knowledge of a fact, and as such falls out of the general account of knowledge of things.
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