Intentions
Intentions
This chapter defends the following claim: A subject intends to achieve G if and only if the subject is disposed to behave in a way that is governed by a version of practical rationality that recommends that G is to be achieved. It is interesting to see what the difference is between a subject being in such a state, and the subject being disposed to behave in a way that is governed by a version of practical rationality which works on the assumption that G is to be achieved. Davidson’s approach to weakness fits very neatly into the account presented here.
Keywords: practical rationality, behaviour, state, weakness, Davidson, intention, belief
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