This chapter introduces functionalism – the supposed successor to behaviourism in the philosophy of mind. Developed by Hilary Putnam, David Lewis and others in the 1960s and 1970s, functionalism was supposed to retain the best aspects of behaviourism and yet, by having a different approach to the causal role of mental states and a different holistic approach to interpretation, was supposed to be a major improvement. It is argued that functionalism should work with a normative conception of a theory of behaviour. The way functionalism is structured means that it cannot get the relation between norms, mental states and behaviour right.
Edinburgh Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.
To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs, and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us.