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Associationism and the Literary ImaginationFrom the Phantasmal Chaos$
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Cairns Craig

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780748609123

Published to Edinburgh Scholarship Online: March 2012

DOI: 10.3366/edinburgh/9780748609123.001.0001

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‘Kant has not answered Hume’: Hume, Coleridge and the Romantic Imagination

‘Kant has not answered Hume’: Hume, Coleridge and the Romantic Imagination

(p.41) 1 ‘Kant has not answered Hume’: Hume, Coleridge and the Romantic Imagination
Associationism and the Literary Imagination

Cairns Craig

Edinburgh University Press

This chapter discusses the concept of, and the views of several notable thinkers on, imagination. It identifies the differences between David Hume and Samuel Taylor Coleridge's versions of imagination. While Hume viewed imagination as purely social and could create endless associations, Coleridge conceived of it as a representation of a better account of the creative mind. It is shown that association works together with imagination, as it provides the mechanical materials which are transformed into an organic order. Romanticism is also discussed in the chapter.

Keywords:   imagination, David Hume, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, creative mind, association, mechanical materials, Romanticism

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