Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Lacan Deleuze Badiou$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

A.J. Bartlett, Justin Clemens, and Jon Roffe

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780748682058

Published to Edinburgh Scholarship Online: May 2015

DOI: 10.3366/edinburgh/9780748682058.001.0001

Show Summary Details

Truth

Truth

Chapter:
(p.164) Chapter Five Truth
Source:
Lacan Deleuze Badiou
Author(s):

A. J. Bartlett

Justin Clemens

Jon Roffe

Publisher:
Edinburgh University Press
DOI:10.3366/edinburgh/9780748682058.003.0005

This chapter discusses the divergences, consequences, and convergences between Badiou's generic formalisation, Deleuze's problematic conception of truth, and the Lacanian insistence on the centrality of truth in analysis, its relationship with the unconscious, and its disjunction or separation from knowledge. Lacan says that we don't have to agree with historical presuppositions, methods, or scientific results; the fact that the very foundation of truth is science means that science differentiate itself as a knowledge-practice by seeking its foundations externally to all or any ancestral knowledge. For Delezue, truth is subject to four fundamental misunderstandings: spontanaeist, logical, catholic, and a-temporal or eternal misunderstanding (where time makes no difference to truth). Badiou reconfigures truth philosophically. He says truth is bearable for thinking, that is something lovable when attempting to grasp its part and not its plenitude or completeness. The chapter concludes that if the passage of a truth were complete, it could be considered generic and a subset of something bigger.

Keywords:   historical presuppositions, spontanaeist misunderstanding, logical misunderstanding, catholic misunderstanding, eternal misunderstanding

Edinburgh Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs, and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us.