This chapter discusses the divergences, consequences, and convergences between Badiou's generic formalisation, Deleuze's problematic conception of truth, and the Lacanian insistence on the centrality of truth in analysis, its relationship with the unconscious, and its disjunction or separation from knowledge. Lacan says that we don't have to agree with historical presuppositions, methods, or scientific results; the fact that the very foundation of truth is science means that science differentiate itself as a knowledge-practice by seeking its foundations externally to all or any ancestral knowledge. For Delezue, truth is subject to four fundamental misunderstandings: spontanaeist, logical, catholic, and a-temporal or eternal misunderstanding (where time makes no difference to truth). Badiou reconfigures truth philosophically. He says truth is bearable for thinking, that is something lovable when attempting to grasp its part and not its plenitude or completeness. The chapter concludes that if the passage of a truth were complete, it could be considered generic and a subset of something bigger.
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