This chapter focusses on ‘returning’ as the key to the redevelopment of the relationship between negativity, change, and time. Lacan says time moves from being thought as the imaginary registration of the event of retroaction as structural repetition to the singular enigma of the presentation of matter. For Deleuze time is the most radical form of change, for the necessity of contingency. For Badiou, time is derivative, where time comes in second place to truth. Lacan is strongly against ideas that state that infantile fantasies condition adult behaviours and other Freudian psychoanalytic archaeology. Deleuze only considers formalization as secondary, an arborescent science, and he seeks out what he considers to be the illegitimate points of fixity — a fixion — in any form of formalisation. Badiou does not attack Lacan's formalisations but goes further, so much so that he is formalising inconsistency itself, which, probably, Lacan recognized himself that he should have gone further with his own formalisations to be able to shed light on anti-Oedipal charges against the primacy of the signifier. For Deleuze, time is the subject while for Badiou, time is truth.
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