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Lord KamesLegal and Social Theorist$
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Andreas Rahmatian

Print publication date: 2015

Print ISBN-13: 9780748676736

Published to Edinburgh Scholarship Online: January 2016

DOI: 10.3366/edinburgh/9780748676736.001.0001

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Moral Philosophy I

Moral Philosophy I

Principles

Chapter:
(p.36) III Moral Philosophy I
Source:
Lord Kames
Author(s):

Andreas Rahmatian

Publisher:
Edinburgh University Press
DOI:10.3366/edinburgh/9780748676736.003.0003

In this chapter the core area of Kames's thought is shown – his moral philosophy. The chapter discusses Kames's idea of the sense of beauty and the moral sense, following Hutcheson and Shaftesbury to some extent, but also departing from them significantly. The definitions of duty and justice, and Kames's criticism of Hutcheson and Hume, as well as the definitions of primary and secondary virtues are presented next. These elements form the basis of Kames's theories of property and of equity in particular, which are presented in chapters 7 and 8. The next sections deal with Kames's mechanistic idea of “man” and the rather deterministic concepts of liberty and necessity in relation to morality. This is followed by a discussion of Kames's view of natural causation and his strong criticism of Hume's concept of causation. The chapter finishes with a first application in the law of these philosophical principles: Kames's treatment of the laws, in the proper sense, of punishment and of reparation (tort).

Keywords:   To be done by publisher

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