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About TimeNarrative, Fiction and the Philosophy of Time$
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Mark Currie

Print publication date: 2006

Print ISBN-13: 9780748624249

Published to Edinburgh Scholarship Online: March 2012

DOI: 10.3366/edinburgh/9780748624249.001.0001

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Inner and Outer Time

Inner and Outer Time

Chapter:
(p.73) Chapter 5 Inner and Outer Time
Source:
About Time
Author(s):

Mark Currie

Publisher:
Edinburgh University Press
DOI:10.3366/edinburgh/9780748624249.003.0005

This chapter addresses the question of inner and outer time, and turns attention on the Augustinian foundations of modern philosophies of time, and an analysis of the narrative aspects of Augustine's Confessions. A consideration of the relationship between time, consciousness and self-consciousness is also presented. The representation of memory does nothing to question the forward movement of time. Ursula Heise considers a huge range of factors that affect the ‘experience of time’, and encompasses a range of ideas about time and history, but the philosophy of time is simply missing. Jacques Derrida's impossible object – the internal pocket that is larger than the whole – offers a model for the relationship between subjective time and objective time in general, and a framework for the relationship between the fictional theme of time and the temporal logic of storytelling.

Keywords:   inner time, outer time, Augustine, Confessions, consciousness, self-consciousness, philosophy of time, Ursula Heise, Jacques Derrida

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